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Soft Belarusization: (Re)building of Identity  or “Border Reinforcement”?Abstract
The paper focuses on shifts in official discourse in Belarus since 2014, after the 
Ukrainian events, that are labelled “soft Belarusization”. This new approach can be 
interpreted as an attempt to support nationally oriented identity practices and as an 
attempt to establish more visible political and cultural boundaries between Belarus 
and the “Russian world”. Firstly, this paper elaborates on the specifics of Belarusian 
identity and presents the historical and political background of the ongoing events. 
Secondly, several manifestations of soft Belarusization processes are analysed, such 
as changes in Belarusian authorities’ rhetoric, their changing attitude towards 
the Belarusian language and unofficial state symbols and previously officially 
disregarded historical events and personalities, steps towards the creation of new 
symbols, and new relationships between official and “alternative” discourses.
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Since 2014, the post-Soviet region has witnessed crucial shifts in its political, social and everyday life. To a larger extent, these shifts 
were catalysed by the events that took place in Ukraine after the Ukrainian 
Revolution, the annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in the east 
of the country. Having affected Ukraine directly and the most, these events 
also had far-reaching consequences for other former Soviet countries, 
particularly Russia, which anchored its hegemonic role in the region, and 
Belarus. These events have also shown that the present-day geographical 
(physical) borders in Europe could still be subject to change and that former 
seemingly definite national boundaries could be reinterpreted, shifted and/
or deformed by the “soft power” moves of authorities who are extensively 
supported by the media. 
As Russia’s political ambitions (supported by military force) became 
clearer, Belarus, known as one of the most pro-Russian countries in the 
region, found itself in a difficult position: on the one hand, the country felt 
a need to strengthen its position as a sovereign state, but on the other hand 
it had to deal with the consequences of a long period of a strong “Russifying” 
influence from inside and outside the country, which in the end has led 
to what can be described today as a “blurred national identity”. Belarus’s Path Towards a “Blurred” Identity
As is known from history, Belarus in its present-day geographical borders 
did not become an independent “national state” until 1991, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Throughout most of its history, this territory has always 
been a part of larger multinational states, and the political, cultural, religious 
and linguistic influences of its “greater” neighbours, particularly Poland and 
Russia, have always been prominent. Following the rise of the nationalist1 
movement at the end of the 19th century and the significant development 
of Belarusian culture during the first two decades of the 20th century, 
ideas of creating a nation-state started to emerge among the Belarusian 
intelligentsia. In 1918, the short-lived Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR, 
БНР – Беларуская народная рэспубліка) appeared and was considered by 
many to be the starting point of modern Belarusian statehood. However, 
1 For the purposes of this article, the term “nationalism” is used in a broad sense, and with 
no specifically negative connotations, as “the articulation of a political agenda in the name 
of one particular imagined community with the intention of establishing a nation-state” 
(Rudling, 2015, p. 115).
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it was soon replaced with various other state forms with changing borders 
which ultimately became the BSSR, a part of the Soviet Union until its 
demise. The BSSR’s territory changed radically throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, being divided between the Soviet Union and Poland. Large parts 
of the BSSR’s western half were acquired after the Second World War star- 
ted. After the war, the geographical borders of Belarus settled in their 
present-day form (Frear, 2019, p. 6). 
Culturally and linguistically, however, the historical development of Be- 
larus in the 20th century was characterized by significant heterogeneity 
caused by several internal and external factors that had prevented the 
nationalist idea from becoming the indisputable and generally accepted 
basis for state building. One internal factor could be seen in the lack 
of support for the nationalist agenda among the population. As Rudling 
states, “Belarusian nationalism remained a marginal and contested phe-
nomenon with a limited popular following within an overwhelmingly 
rural and illiterate population with vague ideas of concepts such as nations, 
nationalism, popular sovereignty, and political organisation” (Rudling, 2015, 
p. 127). From outside, Belarusian territory after the First World War served 
as a field for its two neighbours with the most ambitions to exercise their 
influence: resurrected Poland and the newly formed Soviet Russia (though 
the nature of the rivalry and the influence itself was rooted in numerous 
conflicts between those two in previous centuries). In the 1920s, the first 
historic Belarusizatsiya (Belarusization) process started in the eastern parts 
of today’s Belarus, which were under Soviet rule (as part of the korenizatsiya 
(nativization) policies implemented in national republics by the new Soviet 
authorities). Even though these processes, mostly shut down by the new 
Stalinist agenda, lasted less than a decade, and their real results were far from 
achieving any strong basis for an ethnic nation, this period has an almost 
idyllic image and holds a strong place in official national narrative.2 
From the 1930s, the BSSR had been at the avant-garde of Sovietization 
processes and subsequently became one of the pillar republics of the Soviet 
Union. While Belarusian was widely used in education and culture, Russian 
steadily became the main means of communication. As Bekus noted, “the 
replacement of Belarusian by Russian in Belarusian public life was viewed 
as a sign of the successful ‘Sovietization’ of Belarusians” (Bekus, 2014, 
p. 29). Russification was briefly slowed down in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, when the nationally oriented Belarusian elite tried to “Belarusify” the 
country by building its national identity on the basis of its independence 
2 Among recently published studies of Soviet Belarusization, one could mention Aliena Markova’s 
Czech and Belarusian books: Sovětská bělorusizace jako cesta k národu: Iluze nebo realita? (Markova, 
2012) and Шлях да савецкай нацыі. Палітыка беларусізацыі (1924–1929) (Markava, 2016). 
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(with allusions to the times of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) as the 
starting point of Belarusian statehood) and the Belarusian language as the 
main “identity builders”. The situation changed drastically when Aliaksandr 
Lukashenka won the presidential elections in 1994 and started a campaign 
to reduce the national revival policy, which had antagonized those who did 
not wish to abandon Russian as their main language or who had not wanted 
to identify themselves as Belarusians. One of the more crucial changes made 
by Lukashenka was a referendum which saw Russian and Belarusian es-
tablished as the two official languages. His strategy pursued an almost Soviet 
model of building up a new identity that would not be based on language 
or ethnicity but rather on the concept of a multiethnic society, where 
the Belarusians were deprived of their role as a “state-forming nation”. 
Therefore, “Lukashenka’s language policy made Belarus a unique post-Soviet 
republic where political independence constituted a step towards further 
‘Russification’” (Bekus, 2014, p. 34); Belarusian was almost intentionally 
forced out of public discourse and, more crucially, everyday communication.
Another aspect that complicates the process of identity building lies in 
different interpretations of Belarusian historical heritage, especially when 
identifying the beginnings of Belarusian statehood. The latter could be used 
as a reference point in developing the national narrative, supporting existing 
geographical borders, and even providing a basis for “holding a grudge” 
against neighbouring states for owning territories and cities that could/
should have been Belarusian (for instance, Vilnius, Smolensk, and Białystok). 
Traditionally, textbooks on Belarusian history cite the principalities of 
Polatsk and Turav as the first state-like forms where Belarusian statehood 
took root. However, the greatest significance is attributed to the period 
of the GDL. The range of interpretations in this case is broad and tends to 
be even idealized in pro-European (as opposed to pro-Russian) discourse, 
where “the Grand Duchy was constructed as the essence of everything 
Belarusian (including the old Belarusian language and culture)” (White 
& Feklyunina, 2014). Subsequent periods, when Belarusian territories were 
part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and were later acquired by the 
Russian Empire, are respectively presented as periods of Polonization and 
Russification. The short period of the Belarusian People’s Republic, which 
proclaimed its independence on 25 March 1918, is another key moment in 
nationalist discourse and is most frequently used as the point of origin for 
Belarusian sovereignty. Later Soviet discourse and neo-Soviet discourse from 
Lukashenka, however, centred their views on Belarusian sovereignty around 
the BSSR and, most importantly, the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), which 
became an almost mythologized basis for the officially promoted national 
idea and the sole source of a “heroic past”.
SOFT BELARUSIZATION: (RE)BUILDING OF IDENTITY OR “BORDER REINFORCEMENT”?
61COLLOQUIA HUMANISTICA
On Belarusian Identity and its Boundaries
The aforementioned aspects of historical, cultural and linguistic de-
velopment have led to a situation where it is almost inevitable for scholars 
to elaborate on the Belarusians’ complex identity. Earlier in the text, I 
characterized this as “blurred”, since, as I see it, this identity does not have 
a proper shape; it is not always confined to the country’s geographical bor-
ders and can transform under different circumstances. In other studies, Bela-
rusian identity is seen as “split”, “Creole”, “hybrid”, and even “non-existent”,3 
addressing in the simplest terms the presence and different proportions 
of inclination towards the Soviet past, today’s Russia, and/or Europe. 
Analysing the post-Soviet development of Belarus, Belarusian writer and 
philosopher Ihar Babkou has interpreted the Belarusian experience within a 
postcolonial4 paradigm and expressed the idea of today’s Belarus as a country 
with a repressed identity. According to him, Belarusian identity itself cannot be 
easily explained because of the country’s transculturality and existence being 
defined by real and imaginary boundaries surrounding it (Bobkov, 2005, 
pp. 127–136). Boundaries are particularly significant for Babkou’s reflections, 
which he centres around the notion of “borderland” (пограничье):
A borderland is a space adjoined to a boundary, connected and bound by the 
boundary. This is a space for which the boundary itself is the organising principle, 
the essence, and the centre of attraction. The borderland lies on both sides of a 
boundary and its topologic status is paradoxical: the borderland achieves a certain 
integrity through being divided, i.e. through a dynamic event of division, encounter 
and transition between the Self and the Other… .5 (Bobkov, 2005, p. 128)
The boundary itself can be explained in Lotman’s terms as a “line which 
ends an alternating form. This space is defined as ‘ours’, ‘own’, ‘cultural’, 
‘safe’, ‘harmonically organised’, etc. It is confronted by ‘their space’, 
3 See: Bekus, 2014; Hall, 2015; Ioffe, 2003; White & Feklyunina, 2014.
4 Several observations on Russia’s colonial practices in the “North-West Territories” can be found 
in Ėtkind, Uffel’mann, & Kukulin, 2012. For instance, Belarusians and Ukrainians were not con-
sidered “foreign”; they were deprived of their right to be a separate ethnos, and their languages 
were seen as dialects of Russian. At the same time, the inversion of cultural and social differences led 
to the creation of deep, almost racial differences between members of different social strata of the same 
people (Ėtkind et al., 2012, pp. 14–15).
5 “пограничье – это пространство, прилегающее к границе, соединенное и связанное 
границей, пространство, для которого именно граница является организующим 
принципом, сущностью и центром притяжения. Пограничье лежит по обе стороны 
от границы, и его топологический статус парадоксален: пограничье приобретает 
определенную целостность через факт собственной разделенности, т. е. через 
динамическое событие разграничения, встречи и перехода Своего и Чужого…” Transla-
tions into English, if not stated otherwise, are the author’s.
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‘another’s [space]’, ‘hostile’, ‘dangerous’, and ‘chaotic’”6 (Lotman, 1999, 
p. 175). He also argues that “the notion of a boundary is ambiguous. It 
divides but also connects. It is always a border with something, and sub-
sequently it belongs to both bordering cultures, to both semiospheres 
adjoined to each other. The border is bilingual and polylingual”7 (Lotman, 
1999, p. 183). If one combines this interpretation with Babkou’s definition 
of borderland applied to Belarus, one will see that, at least linguistically, 
it is indeed an identity too heterogeneous to grasp and appeal to. The 
significance of language in identity building is indisputable, although, as 
Neumann points out: “what makes language an important bearer of national 
identity, however, is not necessarily its distance to other languages relevant 
to the social setting in question. … even states that profess to have the same 
state language will make linguistic differences a matter of political identity” 
(Neumann, 1999, pp. 6–7). As is generally known, the Russian language 
dominates all spheres of life (except for “serious” fiction writing) in Belarus, 
since Belarusian has been successfully marginalized. Moreover, “Belarusian 
Russian” has slowly become a new identity marker in official Belarusian 
discourse. As its main actor, Lukashenka is attempting to move Russian 
into the realm of the Self and draw a line between the two variants of the 
language, hence seeking to create a new boundary for national identity:
I want to emphasize that Russian is not alien for us. It is our national patrimony. 
For centuries Belarusians contributed to its development and enriched it. … The 
Russian language is my Russian language. It lives. And it has contributions from 
not only Russians. It is a completely different Russian, intertwined with the morals, 
characters and tolerance of the Belarusian people too. It has developed through 
the centuries. Our language, Russian, spoken by Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians 
and many others – it is an entwinement of many peoples’ souls.8 (Matveev, 2017)
6 “черту, на которой кончается периодичная форма. Это пространство определяется как 
«наше», «свое», «культурное», «безопасное», «гармонически организованное» и т.д. Ему 
противостоит «их-пространство», «чужое», «враждебное», «опасное», «хаотическое».”
7 “Понятие границы двусмысленно. С одной стороны, она разделяет, с другой – 
соединяет. Она всегда граница с чем-то и, следовательно, одновременно принадлежит 
обеим пограничным культурам, обеим взаимно прилегающим семиосферам. Граница 
би- и полилингвистична.”
8 “Хочу подчеркнуть, что русский язык для нас не чужой. Это и наше национальное 
достояние. Белорусы за свою многовековую историю внесли немалый вклад в его 
развитие, обогатили его. Русский язык – это мой русский язык. Это живое. И в нем вклад 
не только русских людей. Это совершенно иной русский язык, куда вплетены нравы, 
характеры, толерантность в том числе белорусского народа. Он развивался из века в век 
<…> Наш язык, русский язык, на котором разговаривают россияне, белорусы, украинцы 
и многие другие, – это сплетение душ многих народов.”
SOFT BELARUSIZATION: (RE)BUILDING OF IDENTITY OR “BORDER REINFORCEMENT”?
63COLLOQUIA HUMANISTICA
Returning to the problem of boundaries and borders, it should be said 
that in Belarus the border itself has become a polysemantic phenomenon 
that sometimes tends to function on a symbolic level. In this borderland, 
real geographical borders get intertwined with imaginary boundaries, such 
as the boundaries of an ethnicity or boundaries that define belonging to 
a greater context and boundaries of sovereignty. The situation is reasonably 
clear when one looks at the border with those countries that are now a part 
of the European Union and Schengen area. From the perspective of social 
practice, this border is non-transparent and has physical attributes. The 
process of crossing it is linked with several social conventions individuals 
must follow, which results in their realization of their place in a social 
hierarchy9 followed by shifts in political, cultural and economic paradigms. 
In terms of social practices and identity, Belarus’s physical border with 
Ukraine (with no visas but with border and customs control) may be 
interpreted as a semi-transparent boundary. There is a more significant 
aspect of recent shared historical experience, but cultural and linguistic 
contrasts are less obvious and less rigid. The most ambiguous border is the 
Belarusian–Russian one; it is transparent on a social level with almost no 
physical attributes as a result of the agreement about the Union State of 
Russia and Belarus with the visa-free movement of citizens. Consequently, 
an average Belarusian who travels by train to Moscow might not even realize 
the moment of change between the “Self’s space” and the “Other’s space”. 
Linguistic differences are almost absent, and ultimately there is little to no 
sense of alienation on either side. However, the Belarusian–Russian border 
has frequently become a subject of politicization during various conflicts 
and fallouts between the two countries. The border and customs controls 
for commercial transportation have become stricter, and mutual threats are 
made to tighten the border regime. Recently, this became especially relevant 
after Belarus introduced a short-term visa-free regime for tourists and was 
suspected of transporting banned European products from the sanctions 
list into Russia under the guise of “Belarusian” products. From Russia’s 
standpoint, the border with Belarus can be seen as conditional; in the eyes 
of the “imperially tempted” neighbours, the boundaries of the “Russian 
world” protrude over the Belarusian borders. After Crimea, this protrusion 
became more palpable and threatening, and several shifts were manifested 
in the current national narrative as well as in the official discourse of the 
Belarusian political elite.
9 The process of crossing the border and its connection to social hierarchies have been analysed 
by Olga Sasunkevich (2015).
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A threat From the East?
As was said earlier, the events in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014 are generally 
recognized as the main impulse for rather radical changes in official 
discourse, especially in the Belarusian context. As Mozheyko sums up the 
situation, “After Crimea, the Belarusian authorities suddenly realized the 
risks of a not fully formed national identity together with political, cultural, 
information, and economic dependence on Russia” (Mozheĭko, 2018). 
Politically and economically, during the two decades after Lukashenka was 
elected president for the first time, Belarus was mostly playing the role of a 
“smaller brother” for Russia, providing loyalty in exchange for economic 
benefits. Culturally and information-wise, Belarusian territory has been 
strongly influenced by Russian media, which may have the image of being 
a more advanced and quality source of information and entertainment. 
However, after 2014 the situation has changed from both sides of the 
border. Firstly, according to Wilson:
Russia is much more aggressive towards all of its neighbours. But it is also more 
demanding of them. … it is looking for more value-for-money in all its relationships. 
The old subsidy regime cannot be as generous as it was, and, with Russia struggling 
to subsidise Crimea and the Donbas, it is pretty clear that it could not afford to pay 
all the bills of an extra nine and a half million Belarusians. (Wilson, 2016, p. 87) 
Besides economic moves, there are clear ambitions to claim Belarus as 
a land of absolute Russian influence by different means: by exporting the 
ideology of the “Russian world”, promoting possible benefits of Eurasian 
integration, and strong media propaganda. As Wilson observes: 
Russia clearly has an option on ‘Operation Belarus’. Russian nationalists have been 
given license to criticise Lukashenka for his lack of loyalty, and his shift towards, 
or firmer embrace of, some kind of statist nationalism since 2014. Networks 
like zapadrus.su and imperiya.by are promoting the old nineteenth century idea 
of Belarus as ‘West Russia’ and have attacked ‘Litvinism’ – depicting the idea 
of an independent and Western Belarus as an artificial emanation of the ‘foreign’ 
Grand Duchy of Litva (Wilson, 2016, pp. 79–80).
Paradoxically, these seeds of Russia’s campaign for influence in the region 
have fallen on fertile soil, because a substantial part of Belarusian society, 
as surveys show, was supportive of Russian actions in Crimea and the Donbas 
and expressed a favourable attitude towards their eastern neighbours during 
the conflict with Ukraine.10 Having in mind the twenty-year period of sup-
10 According to a national survey conducted by IISEPS, around 50% of respondents support-
ed Russia’s actions during the conflict with Ukraine and were not ready to defend Belarus in 
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pressing “radical nationalism” together with national culture and the Belarusian 
language, Klaskovskiy has come to the conclusion that the “Russification 
of not only the language but also the thinking has come so far that it creates 
grave risks for Lukashenko’s regime”11 (Klaskovskiĭ, 2014). In this situation, 
as Lukashenka was not willing to go for direct confrontations, he opted for new, 
rather hectic strategies that were partly centred around the idea of supporting 
social practices that could theoretically lead to strengthening Belarusian 
national identity. Since then, “soft Belarusization” has become a new trend 
in the political, cultural and social spheres, and it can be interpreted as an 
attempt to support nationally oriented identity practices and as an attempt 
to establish more visible political and cultural boundaries between Belarus 
and the “Russian world”. On an official level, “the term ‘soft Belarusization’ 
was employed by Lukashenka publicly for the first time during his open 
dialogue with the media in January 2015” (Mojeiko, 2015).
Soft Belarusization: Official Rhetoric  and Discursive Events12
When speaking of soft Belarusization, it should be mentioned that this 
concept, although adopted in the official discourse of Belarusian elites, has 
several levels, and only a few of the processes at these levels were initiated by 
the authorities; rather, they have happened spontaneously and, notably, had 
their beginnings even before the events in Ukraine, in the form of several 
business and civic initiatives, cultural events and creatively reinterpreted 
courses of the Belarusian language. These activities may be the real substrate 
of the Belarusization processes; however, here I will mostly concentrate on 
the manifestations of soft Belarusization processes at the official/state level, 
as some of the changes appear to be quite unconventional for otherwise 
rather predictable official discourse.
As stated earlier, a number of shifts were observed in this area, many 
of which had an almost symbolic meaning in the geopolitical situation that 
changed after the Ukrainian events. For example, Lukashenka’s speech on 
1 July 2014 (Lukashenko, 2014b), two days before Belarus’s Independence 
Day, resonated in the Belarusian media space. For the first time in many 
military conflict with Russia (Nezavisimyĭ institut sotsial’no-ėkonomicheskikh i politicheskikh 
issledovaniĭ [NISEPI], 2014).
11 “русификация не только языка, но и мышления белорусов зашла настолько далеко, 
что создает серьезные риски для режима Лукашенко.” In the body of the text, “Lukashenka” 
is transcribed from Belarusian, whereas “Lukashenko” is transcribed from Russian.
12 I understand a discursive event as an event that “appears on the discourse planes of politics and 
the media intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time. … If an event becomes a di-
scursive event, it influences the further development of discourse” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, pp. 48–49).
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years, a part of the president’s speech was presented in Belarusian, and this 
part of the speech was devoted to the country’s freedom and independence, 
talking about the unity of the nation formed by the experience of the Great 
Patriotic War. The codification of the given message in the given politically 
ambiguous situation in a language which Lukashenka himself has often 
referred to in an unflattering manner,13 and which has often been associated 
with the country’s political opposition, can be interpreted as a symbolic 
gesture. Here, the language is a symbol of independence with a special accent 
on the unity of the nation regardless of the language of communication 
as, according to Lukashenka, “everyone who encroaches on the unity 
of the nation is an enemy of Belarus” (Lukashenko, 2014b). Generally, in 
the official discourse after 2014, Belarusian is frequently given the place of 
a significant factor in protecting sovereignty and is now presented as a key 
component of Belarusian national identity. In this respect, another now 
famous statement by Lukashenka should be mentioned, as it presents his (i.e. 
officially promoted) idea of the bilingual character of Belarusian identity: “If 
we lose Russian, we’ll lose our mind. If we forget how to speak Belarusian, 
we’ll cease to be a nation” (Lukashenko, 2014a). Here, Russian is attributed 
rational, practical meaning, whereas Belarusian is given an “imaginary” and 
symbolic quality. In 2019, these ideas have been reflected even in the official 
document titled “The Foundations of Information Security in the Republic 
of Belarus”, where Belarusian is attributed the role of a catalyst for “national 
self-identification of Belarusian society” whereas expanding its “social 
functions and communicative potential … its proper and comprehensive 
development … acts as a guarantor of the state’s humanitarian security”14 
(Sovet bezopasnosti Respubliki Belarus’, 2019, p. 16). 
However, the Belarusian authorities tend to take a somewhat evasive 
stance and have tried to avoid confrontation, emphasizing that by 
supporting Belarusian they do not attempt to either turn away from Russia 
or turn to the West. This approach can be seen in one of the interviews given 
by Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Uladzimir Makei, who manages 
to simultaneously deny and admit the existence of soft Belarusization:
I would not call it ‘soft Belarusization’. Yes, 28 years of independence by historical 
standards is an instant, a moment. And I think that, of course, we should talk about 
the formation of national identity, the national idea, national identification, and 
identity. But probably this is due to the fact that some things are developing, and 
13 Lukashenka’s famous words from 1994 declared that Belarusian was a poor language not capable 
of expressing anything great (https://ru.wikiquote.org/wiki/Александр_Григорьевич_Лукашенко).
14 “расширение социальных функций и коммуникативных возможностей … его пол-
ноценное и всестороннее развитие … выступают гарантом гуманитарной безопасности 
государства”
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someone calls them ‘soft Belarusization’. But why should we abandon our historical 
past? Why shouldn’t we talk about someone who we consider to be a national 
hero? Why shouldn’t we wear our national clothes, and why shouldn’t we speak 
Belarusian? These are normal things, and I do not see anything wrong with that. 
This in no way, as some marginal politicians and media try to interpret, means that 
Belarus is turning somewhere and trying to leave somewhere.15 (Tolkacheva, 2018) 
Makei’s series of rhetorical questions refers to three important aspects 
in relation to which there have also been shifts in official rhetoric. The first 
aspect is related to the historical past and historical memory. Both elements 
have also been reflected in the aforementioned “Foundations of Information 
Security”, which declare that there is a need for consistent implementation 
of the “official historical politics aimed at consolidating the Belarusian 
national concept of the country’s historical past and the Belarusian memory 
model both in Belarus and beyond its borders”16 (Sovet bezopasnosti 
Respubliki Belarus’, 2019, p. 17). As with the problem of Belarusian, the 
document does not mention the threats and “enemies” directly, although 
one cannot but notice the part saying “beyond its borders” which certainly 
provides room for speculating about its addressee. 
As mentioned above, in the “pre-Crimean times”, it was the Soviet past 
that was primarily used as the historical basis for identity building practices 
in which the Great Patriotic War was the key event that in the Belarusian 
interpretation combined two discourses: heroism and victimhood.17 At the 
same time, a parallel “oppositional” national narrative has been developing, 
in which key significance is attributed to the period of the GDL, and the 
most widely celebrated holiday is Freedom Day (Дзень Волі), celebrated 
every 25 March, on the day of the declaration of independence of the 
BPR. In recent years, the official authorities have begun to adopt a part 
15 “Я бы не стал называть это «мягкой белорусизацией». Да, 28 лет независимости по 
историческим меркам — это миг, мгновение. И я считаю, что, конечно же, мы должны говорить 
о формировании национального самосознания, национальной идеи, идентификации и 
идентичности. Но, наверное, это связано и с тем, что развиваются какие-то вещи, которые 
кто-то называет «мягкой белорусизацией». А почему мы должны отказываться от своего 
исторического прошлого? Почему не должны говорить о том, кого мы считаем национальным 
героем? Почему не должны носить свою национальную одежду, не должны говорить на 
белорусском языке? Это нормальные вещи, и я не вижу в этом ничего зазорного. Это ни 
в коей мере, как пытаются это трактовать некоторые маргинальные политики и СМИ, не 
означает, что Беларусь куда-то разворачивается и пытается куда-то уйти.”
16 “государственная историческая политика, направленная на закрепление в Беларуси и 
за ее пределами белорусской национальной концепции исторического прошлого страны 
и белорусской модели памяти”
17 At the beginning of the 21st century, a new subject was introduced into the curricula of scho-
ols and universities, entitled “Ideology of the Belarusian State”, which was subsequently comple-
mented by another compulsory course entitled “The Great Patriotic War”.
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of discourse uncharacteristic for them, but once again, as Lastouski ob-
serves, “slow Belarusization takes place mainly wherever it does not arouse 
conflicts. For instance, the actualization of the GDL’s history does not lead 
to a direct confrontation with the Russian state’s historical narrative”18 
(Kazakevich & Lastoŭski, 2016). A certain recognition of the non-Soviet 
historical heritage is also observed in the official permission to celebrate 
Freedom Day. Previously, these celebrations were almost always associated 
with arrests of political activists and participants of unauthorized marches. 
In 2018, on the 100th anniversary of the BPR, celebrations were allowed 
in Minsk and other Belarusian cities, where they attracted the highest ever 
number of participants.19 However, in 2019 officials have radically changed 
their stance towards the holiday. It was not allowed to celebrate it publicly 
in Minsk, therefore the main activities took place in Hrodna, whereas in 
Minsk several people were arrested during the unofficial celebrations.
In addition to Freedom Day, 2018 also saw the authorization of the 
“Dzyady” memorial march. This march carries a strong element of anti-
Soviet discourse, since one of its goals is to commemorate the victims of 
Stalinist repressions. At the end of the marches, there are usually rallies at 
the Kurapaty memorial complex, a place of mass executions in the 1930s.20 
By allowing these events to take place, the authorities tacitly agree with 
the presence of the historical symbols of Belarus – the white-red-white 
flag and the Pahonia coat of arms, both repressed symbols replaced by 
slightly modified Soviet symbols after the 1995 referendum. In the official 
discourse, therefore, one can observe a partial rehabilitation of the symbols 
of a competing discourse. This can be interpreted as the adoption of 
a “lesser evil” (elements of opposing rhetoric) strategy in order to achieve 
a greater consolidation of identity practices (at the same time, of course, 
partly depriving the political opposition of its influence). In addition, 
the problem of these symbols was recently medialized once again, on the 
occasion of a draft law proposed by the sole representative of the opposition 
18 “павольная беларусізацыя праходзіць, перш за ўсё, там дзе гэта не выклікае канфліктаў. 
Напрыклад, актуалізацыя гісторыі ВКЛ не вядзе да наўпростай канфрантацыі з гіс-
тарычным наратывам расійскай дзяржавы.”
19 Even though the celebrations were sanctioned, several opposing politicians were detained 
“preventively”. In 2017, the Freedom Day celebrations took place together with a rally against 
a new law on preventing “social parasitism”, which led to numerous arrests of participants. 
20 As is also the case in Russia, the attitude of the Belarusian authorities towards the period of 
Stalin’s rule is very ambiguous. For a long time, Kurapaty has remained an “eyesore” for the official 
leadership of the country, who have long promised to erect a memorial there. In addition, in the 
early 2010s, the protected area around the memorial was reduced to allow the construction of en-
tertainment facilities in the immediate vicinity. A restaurant was built near the site, where activists 
constantly organise pickets. In spring 2019, the authorities ordered the removal of a number of 
wooden crosses installed around Kurapaty (officially: “to move them to a more suitable location”).
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within the Belarusian parliament. The law’s main idea is to give the white-
red-white flag the status of historical and cultural heritage and allow it to 
be used during public, cultural and sports events. However, experts such as 
Klaskovskiy appear skeptical, since legitimization of this flag could diminish 
the results of Lukashenka’s personal struggle against it and the nationally 
oriented opposition (Klaskovskiĭ, 2018). Consequently, the symbolic 
function of the current Soviet-ish flag could also diminish together with the 
long-promoted Soviet model of Belarusian identity.
Speaking of other symbols, it is worth mentioning two discursive events 
in which one can follow a certain definition of identity boundaries through 
recognizing, honouring and “appropriating” national heroes (Makei mentions 
them too). Here I refer to the installation of two monuments to historical 
personalities whose activity was in one way or another in confrontation 
between the Belarusian and Russian lands. The first of these was Grand 
Duke of Lithuania Algirdas (Algerd in Belarusian historiography), whose 
monument was erected in Vitebsk. He is regarded as a highly successful ruler 
with numerous achievements and is known for the fact that he undertook at 
least three campaigns against Muscovy and significantly expanded the territory 
of the GDL, which then included all of today’s Belarus. The installation of the 
monument, according to Lastouski, was presented by some as an anti-Russian 
action (Kazakevich & Lastoŭski, 2016). But again, such interpretations were 
officially suppressed and softened. According to coverage by Tut.by, the 
authorities in attendance did not say anything about the monument during 
the opening ceremony, and the sculptor in his interpretation tried to exclude 
the militancy of the monument (the duke has a falcon sitting on his hand, 
which is a sign of hunting, and the monument itself is oriented to the east): 
The falcon on the duke’s hand, in the vision of the sculptor Bondarenko, is 
a message from the past to the future: ‘There is no need to interpret it as if he has 
been hunting. There are no attributes of hunting: for example, there is no hunting 
glove. He left his castle, but not to hunt. It is more of a message, symbolism. This 
duke has founded something for each of us, something to be proud of, something 
that can be used in our national identity.21 (Matveeva, 2014)
The wording of the last sentence is rather peculiar as it presents contem- 
porary national consciousness in Belarus as something that is under con-
struction, and such monuments can have “utilitarian” meaning in this process.
21 “’Сокол на руке у князя, в видении <скульптора> Бондаренко, – «это посыл из 
прошлого в будущее»: «Не надо трактовать, что князь выехал на охоту, здесь нет ее 
атрибутики, например, охотничьей перчатки. Он выехал из своего замка, но не на охоту. 
Это больше символика, посыл. Этот князь что-то такое заложил для каждого из нас, чем 
можно гордиться и что можно использовать в нашем национальном самосознании.”
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Another historical figure whose monument was recently erected in 
Belarus is Tadeusz Kościuszko, who, among his other merits, led the 1794 
uprising against the rule of the Russian Empire on the territory of the Polish- 
-Lithuanian Commonwealth after its second partition in 1793. Kościuszko 
is a multinational hero, but his birthplace is in Belarus, therefore the 
“Kościuszko narrative” is very strong there. Remarkably, financing for 
the monument was received through crowdfunding and not from the 
authorities. However, it is also worth noting that the installation of such a 
“spontaneously people’s” monument was authorized by the local authorities. 
As a result, the unveiling ceremony provided a meeting place for both official 
and nationally oriented discourses. According to the person behind the idea 
of erecting the monument, “We have so many things that separate us. But 
then we found a person that united everybody. … today there are different 
flags here. Because Kościuszko is a hero of all Belarusians and the whole 
of Belarus”22 (Kasperovich, 2018). At the ceremony, Uladzimir Arlou, a Be-
larusian writer and historian, interpreted this event from the point of view 
of the significance of the historical component in delineating the boundaries 
of a national identity (and in defending the physical borders of the state): 
“historical memory, culture, and the nation’s language protect the borders 
of the state better than whole armies”23 (Kasperovich, 2018).
In 2015, another prominent event took place which had the purpose 
of drawing another symbolical boundary between Belarus and the domain 
of Russia’s ideological influence. As mentioned above, the theme of the 
Great Patriotic War is practically the only element around which the official 
national ideology of modern Belarus has been built for more than two 
decades. Similar processes are observed in Russia, where Victory Day is an 
extremely important and ideologically charged holiday. One of the symbols 
of the victory is the Ribbon of St. George, whose ideological message has 
changed significantly since the Ukrainian events: 
At first, it was an element of ‘micropolitics’ to include common people in memory 
practices. But in the last couple of years, the Ribbon of St. George became an obvious 
symbol of the expansion of the Russian view on history that is closely related to the 
ideas and practices of the ‘Russian world’.24 (Kazakevich & Lastoŭski, 2016)
22 “У нас так шмат рэчаў, якія раз’ядноўваюць. І вось мы знайшлі асобу, якая аб’яднала нас 
усіх. <…> сёння тут ёсць розныя сцягі. Таму што Касцюшка – герой усіх беларусаў і ўсёй 
Беларусі.”
23 “гістарычная памяць, культура, мова нацыі бароняць межы дзяржавы лепей за цэлыя 
арміі.”
24 “гэта быў элемент ‘мікрапалітыкі’, каб уключыць у практыкі памяці звычайных людзей, 
але ў апошнія пару год георгіеўская стужка стала відавочным сімвалам пашырэння 
расійскага бачання гісторыі, моцна звязаным з ідэяй і практыкай ‘рускага свету’”
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The large-scale use of the Ribbon of St. George in Belarus provoked 
disapproval from the authorities. In 2015 it resulted in the creation of their 
own Victory Day symbol – the Flower of Victory (an apple flower on a red 
and green background along with the colours of the current Belarusian 
flag and the BSSR flag), which looked like another attempt to create 
identity boundaries and to force out the protrusion of the “Russian world”. 
A similar practice has been carried out in Ukraine, where the new symbol 
of the poppy flower is used, symbolizing the commemoration of the victims 
of war. Assessing the importance of the new symbols through the lens 
of national memory, Fedor, Lewis and Zhurzhenko argued that: 
The Lukashenka regime opted for a new, semantically empty symbol that both 
rejects the Russian memorial hegemony of the St. George’s Ribbon and maintains 
a distance from the Western European victim-centred narrative. The Belarusian 
case is therefore a curious patchwork of reworked Soviet tropes that simultaneously 
assert Eurasian civilizational identity – rejecting Western victim-centred narratives 
and claiming descent from the pan-Soviet Victory – and carve out a separate, non-
Russian space of national memory. (Fedor, Lewis, & Zhurzhenko, 2017)
Moreover, in 2015 Lukashenka did not visit the Victory Day celebrations 
in Moscow, which could be regarded as an attempt to further distance 
himself from Russia. However, in analysing this step, Fedor, Lewis and 
Zhurzhenko do not see grounds for an escalation of their confrontation: 
Against the background of events in Ukraine, Lukashenka’s snub and the Flower 
of Victory are minor changes that suggest an apprehensiveness against Russian 
influence, but hardly a desire to antagonize. Regional politics may yet have a pro-
found effect on Belarusian war memory, but for now the memory war is mostly 
confined within the boundaries of the state. (Fedor et al., 2017)
Thus, the Flower of Victory is an example of the way the actors of the 
official Belarusian discourse try to create new symbols and promote them 
in everyday life. However, as Viktar Martsinovich, a Belarusian writer and 
journalist, has pointed out, the new symbol lacked the viral character that 
would make it an appropriate alternative to the Ribbon of St. George and 
make it meet with genuine acceptance. Secondly, its contradictory nature 
(“the semiotic referent of this sign is the Soviet domination; the designate is 
the colour symbolism of the Belarusian SSR”25 (Martinovich, 2016) made it 
empty (hence unpopular) on the inside.
Returning to Makei’s three rhetorical questions, I would like to mention 
yet another transformation which can be seen as one of the manifestations 
of the processes of “soft Belarusization”, but at an everyday level. Speaking 
25 “семиотическим референтом этого знака является советское господство, десигнатом 
— цветная символика Белорусской ССР”
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of “national clothing”, Makei apparently had in mind the vyshyvanka, 
a traditional shirt with embroidery in the form of ornaments, which 
became fashionable in Belarus in 2014. Originally a product of folk crafts, 
the vyshyvanka quite quickly went into mass production by clothing 
manufacturers with a nationally oriented concept.26 Here one might also see 
a parallel with Ukraine, where the vyshyvanka had earlier become a symbol 
of one’s patriotic stance. The vyshyvanka was initially promoted as a unifying 
element for “Belarusians with different political views” (“ArtSiadziba”, 2014) 
by private organizations. One of them was ArtSiadziba, which organized 
the first Vyshyvanka Day in October 2014. However, in 2016 the initiative 
was taken by the Ministry of Culture, which decided to organize its own 
Vyshyvanka Day. Here we see the process of the official discourse borrowing 
elements of an alternative national discourse and adapting them to its own 
needs. If the original initiative had an important natural, spontaneous and 
common essence, the official initiative, as in the case of the Flower of Victory, 
was dominated by formalism, the purpose of which lay partly in suppressing 
spontaneous manifestations of national self-consciousness within the country 
and partly in demonstrating Belarusian identity boundaries.27 Martsinovich 
has described the essential nature of the conflict that emerges when the state 
tries to “appropriate” elements and symbols of alternative discourse: “If one 
tries to explain what the difference is between ‘our vyshyvanka’ and ‘their 
vyshyvanka’, ‘our Belarusian’ and ‘their Belarusian’, which is eventually co- 
ming, it will be very easy. For us, the vyshyvanka, the Pahonia and the Be- 
larusian language provide access to a whole universe full of meaning. 
Belarusian books …, Belarusian artists, … exile, the BPR etc. For them, it is an 
empty envelope, a camouflage to cover all of the same primitive ideas. 
Their core is in keeping ‘their’ stability. And yes, it smells like Sevastopol” 
(Martsinovich, 2016). Conclusions
Zygmunt Bauman’s Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi includes the 
statement that “identity is a ‘hotly contested concept’. Whenever you hear 
that word, you can be sure that there is a battle going on. A battlefield is 
26 It should also be mentioned that on the back of soft Belarusization, several shops were opened 
around the country selling clothes and accessories with national motifs, including the non-offi-
cial Belarusian flag and coat of arms.
27 “І калі спрабаваць растлумачыць, чым жа ўсё такі адрозніваецца «наша вышыванка» 
ад «іх вышыванкі», «наша мова» ад «іх мовы», якая ўжо на падыходзе, атрымаецца вельмі 
проста. Для нас вышыванка, Пагоня, мова – гэта ўваход у цэлы сусвет, які напоўнены 
сэнсам. Беларускімі кнігамі, … Беларускімі мастакамі, … выгнаннем, БНР і г.д. Для іх усё 
гэта – пустая абалонка, маскіроўка, якой яны абгортваюць усё тыя ж прымітыўныя ідэі. У 
аснове якіх – захаванне «іх» стабільнасці. І так, гэта пахне Севастопалем.”
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identity’s natural home” (Bauman, 2004, p. 77). After the Ukrainian events, 
the Belarusian identity, after a virtually stagnant period, became a similar 
battlefield, with soft Belarusization as one of the “weapons”. Naturally, 
it is still premature to assess its tangible results. It seems that today it is 
not a coherent and consistent development strategy, but rather a set of 
fragments or “discursive events”. Their influence on discourse as a whole is 
yet to be seen. The ability of these unsystematic steps to correct the negative 
consequences of insufficient nationally oriented policies in the country and 
to strengthen Belarusian national identity is unclear, as the task is really 
difficult. According to an official survey, only 48 percent of Belarusian 
inhabitants named Belarusian as their native language, and only 3 percent 
use it in everyday communication (Informatsionno-analiticheskiĭ tsentr pri 
Administratsii Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus’, 2018). The education sector 
is still predominantly Russian-speaking, with only 291 university students 
studying in Belarusian in 2017; however, according to the president’s latest 
statements, “[Belarusians] don’t need a Belarusian-language university” 
(Tsyhankoŭ, 2019). This statement once again reflects the inconsistency 
and fragmentary approach to this problem on the part of the authorities.
Nevertheless, there are several signs pointing to a more favourable 
direction for the Belarusian language. According to some experts, there 
is a growing demand for a wider presence of Belarusian in everyday life, 
especially among active urban citizens (see, for instance, Sverdlov, 2019). 
This can be seen, for example, if one follows the increasing interest in 
such seemingly obvious things as watching popular films with Belarusian 
dubbing, which are extremely few today. The situation is corrected, among 
others, by the VOKA streaming service, which offers films with Belarusian 
dubbing watched by more than 45,000 viewers in 2018, and velcom (one 
of the largest mobile operators), which sponsors so-called “Belarusian 
weekends” at Minsk cinemas visited by more than 50,000 viewers in two 
years (“Vidėasėrvis VOKA”, 2018).
On a more skeptical note, the authors of the semi-anonymous Belarusian 
media Belaruski Partyzan claim that:
Although positive rhetoric against the Belarusian language has become more 
noticeable, investment in the popularization of Belarusian in education and 
media is clearly not enough. In fact, Belarusization is turning into a political tool, 
not a social movement. If the regime seeks to contain the influence of Russian 
propaganda, the Belarusization policy should primarily focus on real reforms in all 
areas, not just on symbolic steps.28 (“Belarusizatsyia 2.0”, 2019)
28 “Хоць станоўчая рыторыка ў дачыненні да беларускай мовы стала больш заўважнай, 
інвестыцый ў папулярызацыю беларускай мовы ў сферах адукацыі і сродкаў масавай 
інфармацыі відавочна не хапае. Фактычна, беларусізацыя ператвараецца ў палітычны 
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As Belarus remains strongly dependent on Russia, it is unprofitable for 
today’s government to draw a clear boundary between “them” and “us”. 
At the same time, the actors of official discourse are still trying to create 
the appearance of this boundary in the hope that it will be taken seriously 
inside the country (and lead to strengthening the national identity and 
consolidating the patriotic feelings of the population) as well as beyond 
(by recognizing the right to make their own decisions without ideological 
pressure). In the end, it will be necessary to convince the “interested parties” 
of the genuineness of the ongoing shifts on either side of this boundary. Post Scriptum
The paper was completed shortly before Russian-Belarusian relations 
reached a new confrontational level and became the subject of attention in 
many world media, from Slovakia to the United States29. The main narrative 
of recent months is developing around the idea that Russia is preparing to 
take over Belarus (thus claiming the symbolic “protrusion” over Belarusian 
borders as its own continuation), therefore the terms of the “Union State” 
project have been dragged out of non-existence and it is widely speculated 
that Vladimir Putin has a plan to run for the presidency of the new Russian-
Belarusian state as a way of solving his “2024 problem”.
In the context of such socio-political realities, the concept of “soft 
Belarusization” has, of course, become bleaker, but, on the other hand, its 
real potential may really begin to emerge at this moment. In the militant 
atmosphere of the past months, there is even a new transformation of this 
concept, “hybrid Belarusization” (Tsyhankoŭ, 2019).References
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Мягкая белорусизация: возрождение идентичности  
или «укрепление границ»?
В статье рассматриваются сдвиги, происходящие в официальном 
дискурсе в Беларуси после украинских событий 2014 г., получившие 
условное название «мягкая белорусизация». Данный подход 
может рассматриваться как попытка поддержать национально-
ориентированные идентичностные практики, а также как попытка 
провести более заметные политические и культурные границы между 
Беларусью и «Русским Миром». В первую очередь в статье говорится 
о некоторых спецификах белорусской идентичности и представляется 
исторический и политический фон происходящих событий. Затем 
анализируются некоторые проявления «мягкой белорусизации»: 
изменение риторики официальных представителей республики; 
изменения в их отношении к белорусскому языку и неофициальным 
государственным символам, а также к историческим личностям и со-
бытиям, которые в недалеком прошлом обходились стороной; шаги 
по созданию новых символов; новые отношения между официальным 
и «альтернативным» дискурсом.
Ключевые слова: Беларусь, мягкая белорусизация, идентичность, 
границы, дискурс.
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Miękka białorutenizacja: (od)budowa tożsamości  czy „wzmacnianie granic”?
Artykuł poświęcony jest zmianom w oficjalnym dyskursie publicznym 
na Białorusi, jakie obserwować można po 2014 roku, czyli po wydarzeniach 
na ukraińskim Majdanie, określanych mianem „miękkiej białorutenizacji”. 
To nowe zjawisko może być interpretowane jako próba wspierania 
narodowo zorientowanych praktyk tożsamościowych, a także jako próba 
ustalenia bardziej widocznych granic politycznych i kulturowych między 
Białorusią a „światem rosyjskim” (russkij mir). Przede wszystkim w artykule 
mowa jest o specyfice tożsamości białoruskiej oraz o tle historycznym 
i politycznym aktualnych wydarzeń. W następnej kolejności analizowane 
są niektóre przejawy „miękkiej białorutenizacji”: zmiany w retoryce 
władz białoruskich, ich zmieniający się stosunek do języka białoruskiego 
i nieoficjalnych symboli państwowych, a także wcześniej negowanych 
wydarzeń i postaci historycznych oraz kroki podejmowane w kierunku 
tworzenia nowych symboli, a także budowania relacji między dyskursem 
oficjalnym a „alternatywnym”.
Słowa kluczowe: Białoruś, miękka białorutenizacja, tożsamość, granice, 
dyskurs.
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